Poor Advice to MacArthur?

It is about time for the revisionist historians to take another look at Major General Charles A. Willoughby, the “intelligence” officer who appears to have totally misunderstood conditions in Korea, downplayed the intention and power of the Communist Chinese, and advised his boss, General MacArthur, poorly on more than one occasion.

There had been some hope that time and newly available research would suggest that he did not do as poorly as history has painted him. However, the current availability of some of his papers, to be found at the General Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library Collection , may well paint an even darker picture.

Anyone out there doing a current biography of Major General Willoughby?



Senior Fellow, Paul M. Edwards

Treaty To End the War?

Who makes the peace treaty? We are hearing a lot these days about some sort of final treaty to end the Korean War. After more than half-a-century that would be nice. I wonder, however, just who will be involved in such a treaty.

My understanding is that the cease fire, signed in July 1953, was between the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North), and the United Nations Command. The South Korean government did not sign the cease fire.

As far as I know the Chinese People’s Volunteers no longer exist. Can a treaty of peace be signed between the Koreas? Is that enough? Will the United States, or representatives from the 26 other nations involved have to participate, or is there enough United Nations Command left to take part?

Be interesting to see who we think, now 54 years later, was fighting who.

On another note, if you've never checked out the US Army Heritage and Education Center, it's worth a visit to their website.

Senior Fellow, Paul M. Edwards

54 Years and Counting

On the 27th of July we will mark the 54th year since the end of the Korean War. After three years of fighting and two years and 17 days of talks, the opposing armies finally agreed to a cease fire. A joint policy statement issued by the United Nations pledges to uphold the armistice, and states that any violation will result in a renewal of the war.

During these fifty-four years, of course, there have been many breaches, more than 40,000 according to the federal government. But both sides have worked to prevent it from breaking out into another conflict. The Korean Military Armistice Commission, which was to meet and settle outstanding differences, did not last long. No political settlement has been reached. Constant effort has been made by institutions and individuals to bring about some sort of a peace settlement, but that has proven to be impossible.

What will it take to breach this break in the natural Korean state? Can this generation’s crop of leaders accomplish some sort of “first step” toward solving the potential conflict?

Senior Fellow, Paul M. Edwards

Panmunjon Corridor

Does anyone remember the Panmunjon Corridor? One of the strangest situations where both armies were prevented from attacking, but the North Koreans, at least, were able to move troops and supplies. Arranged as a part of the Panmunjon Security Agreement, it was designed to protect the negotiators from being caught up in the war.

It is easy to locate on a military map of Korea but hard to find out much about how the security of the area was maintained. Anyone remember?

Senior Fellow Paul M. Edwards

No Gun Ri Massacre - Enough Already

The question about the massacre at No Gun Ri has come up again. What are we to believe?

Civilians are killed in wars and an awful lot of civilians were killed in the Korean War because, if for no other reason, the war moved so quickly up and down the peninsula, forcing refugees, displacing persons, and mingling persons of the North and the South. Soldiers hid among the civilians, weapons and supplies were moved by civilians, and on more than one occasion seeming civilians opened fire on UN troops.

There is a good chance civilians were killed at No Gun Ri, and three dozen other places. The effort to turn it in to some sort of massacre requires us to pretend we have knowledge that we do not have; who were the people, what had been happening just before, and what price had the involved units been paying from the presence of "civilians."

The saying when I was there was that you could tell the difference between Communist and Republic troops by watching which way they were running; the North Koreans were running after you and the South Koreans were running with you. Give it a break!

Senior Fellow, Paul Edwards